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Abstract 
 
This essay goes through Frederick 2015 (F15) in some detail, responding to the 
various paraphrases and criticisms therein. It is argued that in each case F15 is 
mistaken about what Lester 2012 (L12) says, or about what F15 presents as a sound 
criticism, or both. It is concluded that the philosophical theory of new-paradigm 
libertarianism that L12 (etc.) comprises has yet to be given adequate critical 
consideration, and that almost all libertarian texts still fall foul of the three 
fundamental errors that L12 (etc.) has explained and corrected at length in response 
to many texts. 
 
Introduction 
 
There are three major and general problems with Frederick 2015 (F15) that occur repeatedly 
throughout. (1) Not showing any grasp of the philosophical problem being tackled and how 
the philosophical theory is supposed to solve it. (2) Paraphrasing with great inaccuracy, 
instead of quoting, and then replying to the inaccurate paraphrases. (3) Repeating the same, 
or very similar, points. There are various ways of dealing with these problems, including the 
following three general approaches. One way would be to dismiss the whole essay as 
substantially irrelevant unless and until it is rewritten to deal with these points; but then such 
rewriting seems unlikely to happen. Another way is to deal with each type of criticism only 
the first time that it occurs in F15; but this could make for a very short reply that might be 
perceived as not doing justice to the detail in that essay, possibly because of a perceived 
failure to be able to respond to those details. A third way is to go through it all fairly 
thoroughly; but this must result in much repetition of similar points that might try the 
patience of the reader. On balance, the third way seems to be the least of the three evils and 
so that has been chosen. 
To put things into context, then, it might help to start by outlining what philosophical 
problem Lester 2012 (L12) chapter 2 is trying to solve and how it tries to solve it; something 
that F15 fails to do, just as Frederick 2013 (F13) also fails to do. 
To quote from the opening paragraph of that chapter: 
 
The standard, modern, economic assumption of instrumental rationality holds people 
to be self-interested utility-maximizers. Economists usually intend this to mean 
egoistic preferences and perfect calculation over time. Insofar as people think this to 
be unrealistic, it throws doubt on the (generally pro-market) conclusions of the 
economists. Here we give the assumption of self-interested utility-maximization an 
aprioristic interpretation that may help to reconcile standard economics with Austrian 
School aprioristic economics. This a priori sense does not imply egoism and is not 
trivial. Economics requires this sense as a core assumption in order to link its results 
more convincingly to liberty, welfare, and anarchy. This book‟s conceptions of 
liberty, welfare, and anarchy also presuppose some such account. (11) 
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This can be explained more generally. Assuming a central aprioristic
2
 theory of instrumental 
rationality (as an interpretation of „economic man‟), people are thereby—other things being 
equal—better (albeit still fallible) judges of their own liberty (what are free personal choices) 
and welfare (what makes them better off); and their empirical choices will tend to reveal their 
judgements. So if we disagree with their choices—whether those choices are purely personal 
or proactively impose on others—then it usually makes sense to reason with them, at least in 
the first place. Without the assumption of such core rationality, it is common to view people 
as sufficiently irrational as to make authoritarian paternalism a default assumption (although 
this appears to leave any actual authoritarian paternalists as equally irrational, and that is 
before considering the limits of knowledge with respect to ruling other people efficiently, and 
the temptations of such power). People are thereby often supposed to smoke or take „drugs‟, 
drink „too much‟ alcohol, eat „too much‟ of the „wrong‟ foods, not exercise „enough‟, 
discriminate against certain people or practices, and generally not to know what they 
„rationally‟ ought to do (whether prudentially or morally), or to know it but fail to do it 
anyway—all because they are „essentially irrational‟. Hence they often need to be ruled by 
proactive coercion, both for their own sakes and the sakes of the other people with whom 
they interact. Belief in this view is one important reason that the popularly elected oligarchs 
of modern states pay only lip service to both liberty
3
 and democracy
4—in order to help to 
legitimise politics—when in reality both liberty and democracy conflict greatly with their 
own preferred, and jealously preserved, oligarchical rule (as well as conflicting with each 
other). Consequently, if one is defending individual liberty both as an end in itself and as 
welfare-enhancing, then the hypothesis that people have no core instrumental rationality is a 
problem, and the hypothesis that they do is a solution. Moreover, many of the other 
ascriptions of „irrationality‟ do not appear to survive philosophical scrutiny.5 None of this is 
to imply that people are anywhere near being perfectly prudent, or that they do not make 
many mistakes. 
This can be given more context still. As the subtitle of the hardback and now 
subsubtitle of the paperback of L12 states, the book is about “Rationality, Liberty, Welfare, 
and Anarchy Reconciled”: their systematic congruence being an extreme form of the, usually 
implicit, “classical-liberal compatibility thesis”. That reconciliation is about providing and 
defending philosophical theories of economic rationality, interpersonal liberty, want-
satisfaction welfare, and private-property anarchy to make sense of their apparent consistency 
in terms of the social scientific evidence (from economics, in particular, but also politics, 
history, sociology, psychology, etc.). The perceived „improbable coincidence‟ of their real 
compatibility has caused some critics to erroneously suppose that L12 is providing what are 
mere stipulative definitions that have simply been formulated in order to fit together. But L12 
explains how each one is a genuine theory of what it is about, and how it could be false or 
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clash with the others. However, there are both philosophical and empirical explanations that 
they are not false and do not clash. 
This essay will now go through the critical responses in F15 in the order in which they 
appear, dealing with most of the errors therein. 
 
 
“Abstract” 
 
The “Abstract” of F15 includes the statement that L12 
 
defends two hypotheses: that instrumental rationality requires agents to maximise the 
satisfaction of their wants and that all agents actually meet this requirement. (1) 
 
This is mistaken. The utility-maximisation aspect is explained in L12 as follows: 
 
4) Utility-maximization: What one has the strongest desire to do, one has the strongest 
utility at the thought of doing. Agents aim at the goal the thought of which gives them 
the greatest utility, or least disutility, at the time of aiming at it …. (14) 
 
There is no statement or implication that agents, are trying to, “maximise the satisfaction of 
their wants” over time or that “all agents actually meet this requirement”. An inaccurate 
paraphrase is used, and later criticised, instead of an accurate quotation—as also occurs 
throughout F13. 
 
“2. Instrumental Rationality” 
 
The a priori theory of economics‟ „instrumental rationality‟ (self-interested utility-
maximisation) that L12 is defending can be expressed thus: everyone has self-perceived 
interests (i.e., desires/wants/valued outcomes), whether these are egoistic or altruistic, and he 
always attempts to act on the interest that maximises his utility (i.e., gives him the greatest 
desire-/want-/value-satisfaction) at the time of the attempted action in the circumstances as 
he, conjecturally, perceives them to be. 
F15 tells us that 
 
A minimal conception of instrumental rationality is this: an action is instrumentally 
rational if and only if it is a suitable means to the achievement of the agent‟s ends (2) 
 
A more minimal conception (in the sense that it is, more or less, a priori) of instrumental 
rationality is this: an action is instrumentally rational if and only if it is intended to be a 
suitable means to the achievement of the agent‟s current subjective ends. And that is, 
roughly, the conception that is used and defended in L12. 
But F15 goes on to assert that 
 
As it stands, this statement may be interpreted objectively, subjectively, or part one 
way, part another. (2) 
 
“As it stands”, F15‟s statement is ostensibly only objective: “it is a suitable means to the 
achievement of the agent‟s [actual/objective] ends”. 
 F15 continues, 
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Lester undertakes to defend a thesis, which he labels „instrumental rationality,‟  
according to which every agent seeks to maximise the satisfaction of his wants over 
time (2012, 13-16). (2) 
 
As shown, the cited pages explicitly reject that. There is no such hypothesis in L12 (if there 
is, then why not quote it?). Hence what immediately follows on from this in F15 is irrelevant.  
 F15 goes on, 
 
The second half of Lester‟s a priori thesis of instrumental rationality is a 
hypothesis about agency, namely, 
 
(LA) all actions are instrumentally rational. 
 
Only by intention under the perceived circumstances. But F15 immediately rejects this: 
 
A qualification needs to be added. … we should say that the agent will act to satisfy 
his strongest desire provided the action is possible for him and he thinks that it is. (3) 
 
No: we always do attempt to satisfy our strongest desire in the circumstances as we 
conjecturally perceive them to be. The action need not be possible. 
 
“3. Weakness of Will” 
 
As L12 says, nothing is here meant to deny the existence of „weakness of will‟ in the sense of 
„lack of determination or willpower‟. For instance, Peter might be able to hold his hand in 
painfully cold water significantly longer than Paul (assuming, arguendo, very similar 
subjective experiences of pain). That some people are „strong-willed‟ and others are „weak-
willed‟ in terms of „determination‟ or „willpower‟ is not the same sense as occurs in 
discussions of supposed „akrasia‟: meaning, „not acting in the way that one believes to be the 
best‟. More centrally, L12 holds that confusion is avoided by distinguishing levels of 
desire/want/value. One may have a first-level (or immediate) desire/want/value in favour of 
X, but a second-level (or meta-)desire/want/value that is against the first-level one. And the 
stronger of the two levels necessarily prevails. When the first-level is stronger and so 
prevails, that is mistaken for akrasia. (In principle there could be a third-level, and so on, but 
such complications do not need to be discussed here.) 
F15 asserts that L12‟s exposition of how weakness of will (i.e., akrasia) can be 
explained away “is not entirely clear” (4). But there is no quotation to illustrate this alleged 
lack of clarity. Therefore, as usual, an attempted paraphrase by F15 follows instead (here in 
three parts): 
 
(i) of all the agent‟s first-level desires for action in the circumstances, the agent‟s 
strongest desire is the desire to perform the action he does perform; 
 
Wrong: he attempts to perform the action consonant with his strongest first-level desire in the 
conjecturally perceived circumstances—unless there is a relevant stronger second-level 
desire (such as a desire to resist that desire). 
 
(ii) that action has consequences, or aspects, which the agent desires not to be, and 
this first-level desire is greater than any second-level desire he has to retain the desire 
to perform the action; 
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Where this says “to retain the desire”, this might be an error for „to refrain from the desire‟. 
Otherwise, how does it make sense? But again, in any case, so much for F15‟s attempt at 
being “entirely clear”. 
 
(iii) as a consequence of (ii), of all the agent‟s second-level desires about the first-
level desires in play in the circumstances, the agent‟s strongest second-level desire is 
the desire not to have the desire to perform the action. 
 
Whether and how and this is a “consequence of (ii)” is not clear. In any case, the first-level 
desire to perform the action is, at that time, stronger than the second-level “desire not to have 
[or to refrain from acting on] the desire to perform the action”. 
  To supposedly illustrate its three parts, F15 then quotes the examples of the smoker 
and the chocolate-eater in L12 and asserts that “this alternative account of apparent cases of 
weakness of will is not convincing” (4). This is because 
 
Contrary to (i), the smoker who suffers weakness of will fulfils his desire to continue 
smoking despite the fact that he thinks he would be better off if he did not. 
 
This is simply to restate the common sense, but paradoxical, view of weakness of will 
(akrasia). The two-levels of desire explain away the paradox with akrasia that F15 apparently 
fails to see, because for F15 having a greatest “desire” for X and believing that ~X makes one 
“better off” are held to be incommensurable phenomena. But “desires” (or what is wanted) 
and what is thought “better” (or what is valued) are often translatable into each other: in some 
obvious sense, someone must value what he desires/wants and must desire/want (in some 
way) what he values. So it appears to be inconsistent to say „I most desire (or want) X but I 
think best (or most value) ~X‟, hence the paradox of akrasia. We must want what we 
genuinely think, at the time, is overall best under the perceived circumstances. 
F15 continues: 
 
Similarly, the woman suffering weakness of will does not feel that life without 
satisfying her desire for chocolate is too miserable to forego satisfying that desire. On 
the contrary, she feels that life without satisfying that desire would be better than life 
in which the desire is satisfied. (4) 
 
Again, this merely reasserts the paradoxical common-sense view whereby we do not do what 
we supposedly think it better to do. 
 F15 asserts that 
 
These seem to be descriptions of ordinary facts of life and ones which many smokers 
and chocolate-eaters offer as a description of their situations. 
 
But how can these be true “descriptions of ordinary facts of life”? This is analogous with 
hearing evidence that the Earth, other planets, and stars revolve around the sun 
(heliocentrism), and then saying in response that the sun, etc., going round the Earth 
(geocentrism) is one of the “descriptions of ordinary facts of life”.6 This ignores the problem 
and the proffered solution and simply restates the common-sense view. 
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 F15 goes on to say that 
 
Often people make such assertions, or have such thoughts, as a prelude to taking steps 
to prevent themselves from smoking or from eating chocolate. Such steps may 
involve other people who can help to restrain them from actions they strongly desire 
to perform but which they think it is better not to perform. (4) 
 
There is a coherent distinction between actions people “strongly desire” and those that they 
“think it is better not to perform”. But can this distinction between “desire” and what is 
“better” be coherently made in the context of akrasia? For that would be saying that what we 
„overall most desire to have‟ need not be what we think to be „overall best to have‟. The 
appetitive connotations of “desire” are not relevant here. „Most desired‟ means only „most 
wanted‟—for whatever reasons, including prudence and morality. So one is supposed to hold 
both that, 1) all things currently considered, at this moment, I most want X, and 2) all things 
currently considered, at this moment, I think it best that I do not have X. But what you „most 
want to have‟ you must, in some obvious sense, think it „best to have‟, and vice versa. 
Admittedly, it is not possible to deduce a clear contradiction (A & ~A) if there is an 
insistence on a distinction between what is „most desired/wanted‟ and what is thought „best‟. 
But there is an intuitive inconsistency—hence the problem with akrasia—and so the alleged 
distinction is not at all clear. 
That said, there are two relevant ways of interpreting the above quotation. One is 
binding one‟s future self and the other is binding one‟s current self. There is no weakness-of-
will paradox in binding one‟s future self. People can consistently ask other people to “help to 
restrain them from actions they [will most] strongly desire to perform [later at T1] but which 
they think [now at T0] it is better not to perform.”7 And the distance in time between T0 and 
T1 can be a mere moment. It is only all this happening at the same time that is inconsistent. 
And, as explained, it is not clear that F15 can avoid this inconsistency by trying to distinguish 
a “desire” from what one thinks is “better”. For what is inconsistent is, at time T0, both most 
desiring (thereby thinking it overall best in some sense) to perform some action and thinking 
it overall best (thereby most desiring in some sense) to be restrained from performing it. 
 F15 then makes an interesting and related suggestion: 
  
Contrary to (iii), the weak-willed agent might not desire to be rid of the desire to 
perform the action he performs. For example, the woman who eats chocolate even 
though she most wants to stop eating it, 
 
Here, incidentally, F15 slips into even clearer inconsistency. How can one willingly do what 
one “most wants” not to do? F15 continues that she 
 
may desire to retain her desire to eat chocolate; and her desire to retain her desire to 
eat chocolate may be stronger than any desire she has to be rid of the desire to eat 
chocolate. For, although she would rather not eat chocolate, she may value very 
highly her desire to eat chocolate, perhaps because she values having that desire for 
its own sake, or perhaps because she values having that desire frustrated, either 
intrinsically or as evidence of her willpower (or for some other reason). Therefore, 
while her first-level desire not to be fat conflicts with her first-level desire to eat 
chocolate, it need not conflict with her second-level desire to retain her desire to eat 
chocolate. (5) 
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It is true that one can desire to keep a desire that is problematic in some respects. To respond 
relevantly, we first have to make the second-level desire more precise: the desire (or thinking 
it overall „better‟) that the first-level desire continues but is somehow “frustrated”. In the 
previous case, the stronger desire to have or do X overrides the weaker desire to not have—or 
to resist—the desire to have or do X. But now there is no direct clash of desires. For the 
desire (or thinking it overall „better‟) to have some desire but have it “frustrated” is merely an 
idle wish unless we can act on it. However, if we can act on it (e.g., pressing this button will 
somehow cause the frustration of the first-level desire), then we are back with a direct clash 
(the agent will only press the button if his second-level desire to have but frustrate his first-
level desire is stronger than that first-level desire). Therefore, the second-level „desire to have 
a desire but have it “frustrated”‟ fits the two-level analysis just as well as the „desire not to 
have, or to resist, a desire‟ (and doubtless there are other types of second-level desire that also 
fit). The apparent paradox of akrasia has still been explained away. So F15 remains confused 
to conclude that 
 
The phenomenon of weakness of will refutes (LA). (5) 
 
“4. Desires and Values” 
 
It is not unusual to make a linguistic distinction between „desires‟ and „values‟. „Desires‟ are 
often thought of as more basic and more appetitive, while „values‟ are often thought of as 
higher and more reasoned. Thus desires and values can appear to be quite different, and even 
incommensurable, things. But L12 observes that to desire something must in some sense 
always be to value it (if only as a way of satisfying that desire) and to value something must 
in some sense always be to desire it (if only as a way of achieving that value). Thus no 
essential difference, or incommensurability, need impede the instrumental rationality that is 
being defended.  
F15 quotes Watson 1975 on the supposed distinction between reason and desire. It is 
asserted that 
 
In contrast, Lester (2012, 28-31) thinks there is only a single source of motivation, of 
reasons for action. We desire something if and only if we value it; though to say that 
an agent values a thing is not to spell out the nature of his desires about it. (5) 
 
Why does F15 repeatedly resort to dubious paraphrase instead of relevant quotation? It is less 
clear and less useful to have to reply to such gratuitous imprecision. F15 continues, 
 
It is, Lester claims, absurd to say that someone is inclined to do something yet does 
not have even a prima-facie reason to do it. (5) 
 
Or as L12 actually says, and in a little more context, 
 
Here „reason‟ is again apparently being used in the sense of a value that we have 
arrived at verbally. That, at least, is the only real sense I can make of Watson‟s 
distinction. This may be a consistent way of talking about things, but it is confusing. 
For in plain language, it is absurd to say that someone is inclined to do something yet 
does not have even a prima facie reason to do it. If he can see no reason whatever to 
do it, then he can hardly desire it. Desire is at least a prima facie reason to do a thing. 
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In Watson‟s examples the benefits of acting on such desires are really seen as hugely 
outweighed by the costs. (31) 
 
F15 responds to the examples in Watson 1975 as follows: 
 
It seems to me that this argument about whether the woman and the man, in Watson‟s 
examples, value as well as desire to perform the actions in question, is a dispute over 
linguistic nuance. The same goes for whether we should say that each of those agents 
has a pro-tanto reason for, or a consideration in favour of, the actions. (5) 
 
The idea that philosophy is ever arguing about “linguistic” usage is false and even philistine. 
To have a desire for something is ipso facto to value that thing and to have a reason to have 
it, at least in that respect and to that extent. To deny that there is any real value or reason here 
is to deny the facts. 
 F15 continues, 
 
But there is a real distinction behind Watson‟s more restrictive linguistic proposal. 
The woman thinks that drowning her child would not be an objectively good or 
valuable action, even though she desires to do it and, therefore, in some sense, values 
it. 
 
She does not merely think that “drowning her child would not be an objectively good or 
valuable action”. She most likely thinks it to be clearly immoral, and thereby categorically 
undesirable/unacceptable (although L12 does not discuss morals at this point). And this “real 
distinction” in a type of desire is thereby not being denied but, rather, explained (whether, 
and in what sense, that moral view is held “objectively” is a separate matter). As discussed 
later in L12, and also defended later here, what we genuinely hold to be immoral we thereby 
desire to avoid at all costs. Therefore, her desire to avoid an act felt to be immoral necessarily 
trumps her weaker desire to do that act. There is no need to abandon the realm of desires or 
wants. This matters because of the core rationality thesis that is being defended. 
 F15 then asserts that 
 
The man may, in some sense, value sexual activities, given that he desires them; but 
he thinks that it would be objectively bad or wrong to satisfy those desires. If, with 
Lester, we want to say that people always value what they desire, then we can say that 
the woman and the man value something they think is not (objectively) valuable. 
 
Or as L12 would interpret it, they feel it to be immoral and hence categorically 
undesirable/unacceptable; and so, ipso facto, they will not choose to act in those ways. It is 
not necessary to posit the realm of the “(objectively) valuable”. 
 F15 says that “Lester recognises (2012, note 46, 209), that this is the point behind 
Watson‟s proposal” but 
 
he misstates what is at issue when he says that Watson needs an account of objective 
values. That is not quite right. To make sense of the man and the woman, what 
Watson needs is to attribute to them a belief in objective values; but he does not need 
to endorse that belief himself. (6) 
 
L12 does not say or imply that Watson does or need “endorse” a belief in objective values. It 
only says that “perhaps” he needs “an account of objective values”. Because without an 
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intelligible “account of objective values” we cannot even “make sense of the man and the 
woman … [having] … a belief in objective values”.  
 F15 continues: 
 
Lester seems reluctant to accept that there are objective values, 
 
Speaking literally, values are inherently subjective: they are someone‟s feelings of value.  
 
and because he mistakenly thinks that acceptance of such is required to give the 
account of the woman and the man that I just gave, 
 
Not “acceptance”, merely intelligibility. 
 
he offers a different account, one which invokes, again, the distinction between levels 
of desire. (6) 
 
That idea is merely mentioned in passing on these issues. The main point in L12 here is, 
rather, the general one that in “Watson‟s examples the benefits of acting on such desires are 
really seen as hugely outweighed by the costs”. But F15 ignores this given explanation and 
launches into its own “levels of desire” account (6) that is simply not in L12 on these issues. 
In any case, moral values/feelings/desires can also be at the first (immediate) level. What else 
is wrong with F15‟s objections to a “level analysis” has already been explained. 
 F15 claims 
 
We have seen that, on Watson‟s view, an agent has desires and values, and only the 
latter give (legitimate) reasons for acting, while on Lester‟s view an agent simply has 
desires, which we may also call „values.‟ 
 
We have seen that Watson 1975 and F15 are confused. We can only act on the basis of what 
we desire/want/value. That does not in any way entail or imply that all desires/wants/values 
are equivalent in terms of prudence, or morals, or importance, or critical preference. 
 F15‟s confusion continues: “Lester seems to see all desires as appetites (2012, 16)”. 
But the fact that L12 happens to use “appetite” in a broad sense on that particular page does 
not mean that a narrow sense is being denied. When “Watson distinguishes appetitive or 
passionate desires from those which are the products of culture or habituation”, L12 can 
happily allow this, as it in no way conflicts with the general instrumental rationality that L12 
is defending. When F15 says that the “latter rank as desires rather than values for Watson 
because, being merely inherited, they are not the products of the agent‟s rational judgement 
[i.e., critical preference] (1975, 214-15)”, this overlooks that all sincere and literal values 
must be felt (valued) and thereby, in some sense, imply relevant desires. All this seems to be 
another case of F15‟s insisting on keeping conventional distinctions that L12 innocuously 
analyses in terms of general desires or wants—to defend instrumental rationality—rather than 
showing that L12‟s analysis is genuinely flawed. 
 F15 then suggests that we “distinguish” the following:  
  
(1) an agent‟s felt desires; 
(2) things an agent thinks are valuable; 
(3) things an agent thinks are valuable for him; 
(4) an agent‟s goals. (6) 
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All of these things can be colloquially distinguished. But that is irrelevant to the problem that 
L12 is addressing: whether instrumental rationality can be defended by explaining all such 
things in terms of an agent‟s attempting to maximise his desire/want satisfaction (in the 
perceived circumstances, at the time of the attempt). This is not to imply that they are all 
illusory distinctions that are completely reducible to the same thing, or that they are all 
equivalent in terms of morals, or prudence, or importance, etc. And clearly they can be thus 
explained. “(1) an agent‟s felt desires”: these are unproblematic. “(2) things an agent thinks 
are valuable”: an agent must in some sense still desire these, if only desire that they exist. 
“(3): things an agent thinks are valuable for him”: he must in some sense desire these for 
himself. “(4) an agent‟s goals”: however these are construed, they cannot be his genuine 
goals unless he desires to realise them in some way. F15 asserts that theorists “have tended to 
conflate these” four things. But to point out the necessary role of desire(or want)-satisfaction 
in them all is not to “conflate” them. By analogy, to point out the necessary role of physical 
competition in different sports is not to “conflate” them either.   
 F15 asserts, 
 
I may value something that I do not desire, and vice versa. For example, if I am not 
hungry and lack a desire to eat, I may nevertheless eat because I value eating for 
social or nutritional reasons; 
 
This all makes good colloquial sense, of course. However, to eat for “social or nutritional 
reasons” is to act on the desire to eat for those reasons. Desire cannot be eliminated. And that 
is all that our homo economicus requires. 
 
or I may go to work despite feeling no desire to do so, because I think going to work 
is valuable for me. 
 
In other words, there is a desire to work but for reasons other than the work itself. The work 
is a means and not an end.  
 
Alternatively, I may be hungry and feel a strong desire to eat, but not eat because I am 
on a diet and think that eating is not valuable for me; 
 
In other words, this is to desire the consequences of not eating more than giving in to a 
“strong desire to eat”. 
 
or I may yearn to get back to work but remain at home because I am recovering from 
illness and I value a swift and full recovery. 
 
In other words, this is to desire a “swift and full recovery” more than the immediate desire “to 
get back to work”. 
 
However, I may also both desire and value something, as when I eat because I have a 
healthy appetite. 
 
In other words, this is both to desire to eat and to desire that desire because of the good 
consequences. 
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So far I have spoken of what is valuable for the agent. But all except the most self-
centred of people think that many things have value even though those things are not 
valuable for the person himself. (6-7) 
 
Things that are “not valuable for the person himself” in a narrow self-interested sense, may 
still be “valuable for the person himself” in the altruistic sense that he values (and thereby 
desires) certain goods for other people (or animals, or the environment, etc.). 
 
For example, someone might think that classical music is valuable for some people, 
and thus valuable, even though he thinks (correctly, perhaps) that it is not valuable for 
him. 
 
This is ambiguous. Either someone has an altruistic value (and thereby desire) that other 
people can consume classical music if they value (and thereby desire) it, or he is merely 
aware that some people value (and thereby desire) classical music. Whichever is meant, this 
is not inconsistent with the given account of how values have a desire aspect. 
 
 This person may have no felt desire for classical music, despite valuing it. 
 
In other words, he has “no felt desire for classical music” in his own life, but he values it and 
thereby has a “felt desire for classical music” in the lives of people who do personally value it 
(and thereby personally desire it). 
F15 then moves on to “(4) an agent‟s goals”: 
 
An agent‟s goal may be to perform an action of a particular type even though 
performing an action of that type is neither desired nor valued by him. (7) 
 
Not clearly appetitively “desired” or deliberatively “valued”, perhaps. But such narrow 
interpretations are not „true essences‟ that can refute broader interpretations. 
 
For example, when I come downstairs in the mornings, while I am waiting for the 
kettle to boil, I pour and drink a glass of orange juice. I do this as a matter of routine, 
without thinking about it. 
 
Or, more precisely, without deliberation. Some form of thought is required. 
 
Sometimes I only know I have drunk the orange juice because I can see the used 
glass. On some such occasions I will not have had a felt desire for the orange juice nor 
will I have thought that drinking it was valuable for me or valuable for anyone else. I 
just drank it out of habit. 
 
Let it be granted that he “just drank it out of habit”. We can only engage in a habit because of 
some sort of a desire to do so. Such actions might not require significant deliberation or 
significant self-consciousness, but there must be some conscious desire or we would be, 
temporarily at least, like unconscious automata (forgetting how we felt at the time about 
some habitual action seems far more plausible than that we were literally not conscious at the 
time). And what we desire we must thereby, in some obvious sense, value—if not value in 
any second-level sense that we might colloquially reserve for talk about „values‟ and what is 
“valuable”. 
 F15 continues: 
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the action was intentional, that is, goal-directed: I was in control of what I was doing 
and of whether I was doing it (I could stop if I wanted); it was something that I aimed 
to do … and if, as I was about to do it, I was asked what I was going to do, I could 
truly have said that I intend to drink the juice. Thus, we can have goals that we neither 
value nor desire 
 
“Desire” is being used in L12 in the sense of a felt „want‟. “I could stop if I wanted” implies 
that he wanted or desired to act as he was. So it looks like another fairly plain, and quite 
perverse, inconsistency to hold that one‟s “action was intentional, that is, goal-directed” but 
in no sense wanted, desired, or valued. And it is only very general senses of „want‟, „desire‟, 
and „value‟ that apriorist instrumental rationality requires. 
 F15 says that “in practice, the term „desire‟ or „want‟ is extended to such cases”:  
 
a person who knows my habit and who sees me go, absent-mindedly, to the fridge in 
the morning, may say that I want to drink some orange juice, or that I desire some 
orange juice. But, in this sense, to say what I „want‟ or „desire‟ to do is just to say 
what I aim to do. 
 
But how can one consistently “aim to do” something without a plain „want‟ or „desire‟ to do 
it? These terms do not seem to be “extended” in any metaphorical or “attenuated” (7) sense. 
Even if what one has an “aim to do” is what is habitual without any thought whatsoever as to 
the content of the habit (if that is possible), still that habitual “aim” itself must be what one 
does „want‟ or „desire‟ to do or achieve. F15 is apparently restricting the meaning of „desire‟ 
and „want‟ to something directly appetitive. This seems to be essentialist language-policing. 
In this case, it both disallows an innocuous, and useful, account of instrumental rationality 
and entails, instead, an intuitively incoherent way of describing actions. 
 
“5. Free Will” 
 
In L12, an agent acts out of „free will‟ when his body moves as he chooses to make it move. 
This Hobbesian sense of „free will‟ is compatible with someone‟s threatening to shoot him if 
he does not do what is demanded, and so he does it. L12 supposes that all acts of free will 
involve the agent‟s trying to achieve what he most desires/wants/values (i.e., gets the most 
utility/satisfaction at the thought of doing) at the time, in the circumstance as he conjecturally 
perceives them to be. L12 also supposes that an agent‟s free will cannot escape physical 
determinism (he chooses but as he must choose) without falling into the randomness of 
indeterminism. However, this „compatibilist‟ assumption is not necessary for instrumental 
rationality. 
In F15 we are told that L12 “employs a passive conception of agency” because the 
“agent always performs the action that he thinks will most satisfy his wants” (7). It is not yet 
clear how this is supposed to be “passive”. Also, it is only about attempting to perform the 
action that does “most satisfy his wants” at that time (although this might relate to the future, 
or to altruistic concerns). 
According to F15, this is “not a conception of agency at all” because 
 
the supposed action is brought about by the agent‟s motivational factors: the supposed 
agent does not act, but is rather the passive recipient of impulsions which propel him 
hither and thither. The agent‟s body moves in response to desires or values, but the 
agent does not act. (8) 
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L12‟s account is fully compatible with the agent‟s reasoning carefully about his possible 
courses of action to select which one is the most preferred. Of course, he has first to find the 
idea of reasoning carefully to be his most preferred option. But it is not clear how an agent 
can possibly avoid ending up with attempting to do what he most desires or wants to do (at 
the time in the perceived circumstances). To not do that would appear to mean „acting‟ 
without motivation (or, at least, with a lesser motivation). 
F15 continues: 
 
Curiously, Lester contrasts his view of the agent, as following his consciously felt, 
self-perceived interests or desires, with a view of the agent as an unconscious 
automaton without a spontaneous will of his own (2012, 14). But how can someone 
who is doomed always to follow his strongest desire be said to have a spontaneous 
will of his own? If Lester‟s agent can be distinguished from an unconscious 
automaton, it is only because he is a conscious automaton. 
 
How can we be “doomed” to being able to, try to, do what we most want to do? Especially as 
that will include as much reasoning, ambition, morality, self-control, etc., as we want. F15 
asserts that “if actions are always dictated by the strongest desire, the agent has no choice”. 
Again, “dictated” is an odd word to choose. So what is supposed to be a more attractive 
alternative?  
 F15 tells us that it is a sense of free will that is 
 
incompatible with determinism … incompatible with that agent‟s actions being 
determined by prior circumstances, whether or not those circumstances include 
desires or valuations. (8) 
 
One thing to mention first is that in Lester 2017 (25-26) there is an extremely brief and highly 
speculative account of how intellectual activity might escape physical determinism without 
falling into mere randomness. That said, it does not appear to be relevant here which account 
of free will is right: compatibilist or incompatibilist. It is not about causality but the 
intelligibility of the account. It does not make sense that someone believes that action X is the 
most desired/wanted/valued at time T, but intentionally does Y at time T instead. This is like 
the alleged existence of akrasia, but more clearly inconsistent. 
 F15 quotes L12 where it says “„The school of thought that demands a kind of free will 
that escapes both determinism and mere randomness has never given an intelligible account 
of a third option‟ (2012, 21)”. F15 calls this “the infamous „chance objection‟ to free will : if 
my actions are not determined, they are a matter of chance; but if they are a matter of chance, 
they are outside of my control”. But “chance” does not seem quite appropriate as it appears 
compatible with determinism that some things happen by “chance” in the sense that they are 
not intended or predictable. F15 says that this is “confusing an undetermined act with a 
random event” and asserts instead that an “act, specifically, an act of will, is something that is 
inherently under the agent‟s control and that is therefore undetermined.” How this escapes the 
compatibilist account of free will without falling into randomness is left mysterious. Perhaps 
there is an explanation in the references F15 gives. However, as Lester 2017 does give an 
attempted explanation, and as this is, in any case, irrelevant to the a priori argument just 
given, those references won‟t be pursued here. 
 F15 then offers the account that  
  
14 
 
many substantial goals that agents pursue, including in some cases getting married 
and raising a family, or spending the weekends getting drunk, or working in the 
family business, or going to church on Sundays, are such that the agent himself 
pursues them without desiring them or thinking them valuable: he is merely acting in 
accord with an inherited theory, doing the done thing. (9) 
 
Even if someone could do the listed things entirely “without desiring them or thinking them 
valuable” in themselves, in any way at any time (which seems far too general to be plausible), 
then in order to have a motive he must desire and value “doing the done thing”.  
 Then there is an analogous account:  
 
Similarly, many of the things an agent holds to be valuable, including things he holds 
to be valuable for himself, will be such that he has never questioned whether they are 
in fact valuable: he is merely taking on trust the truth of a theory handed down to him 
from his elders and teachers by the varied processes of cultural transmission. 
 
Even if it is possible that someone has “never questioned” the valuable nature of some things 
that he “holds to be valuable”, in any way at any time (which seems implausible: 
introspection reveals us to doubt things quite readily and easily), then when he values them 
he will thereby have relevant desires, or wants, about them. Such questioning is not required 
by instrumental rationality. 
 However, F15 later incorrectly states that “Lester deems adherence to inherited 
theories rational because he claims they have withstood the test of rational assessment” (10), 
and he quotes L12 as a purported illustration of this assertion: 
 
people must clearly perceive certain advantages in traditions, evaluate them as 
superior, if only in terms of the costs and benefits associated with those who keep 
them and the costs and benefits associated with those who break them. It is true that 
most people do not go in for radical criticism of all customs or habits they practise. 
They often give very little consideration to some of these, its being sufficient that they 
are content with them and see, on occasional reflection, no advantage to mending, at a 
cost and some risk, what does not seem broken (2012, 31-32). 
 
This is then rejected by F15 for making two false assumptions: (1) “the possibility of a 
rational assessment independent of unexamined inherited assumptions”; and (2) “that such an 
assessment, in however minimal a form, has been completed”. 
(1) As the quotation shows (thereby illustrating the value of quotation), L12 is making 
a point about traditional practices (“customs or habits they practise”); i.e., such things as 
marriage, celebrating Christmas, political elections, shaking hands, etc. These involve 
intended actions that can be given instrumentally “rational assessment”. F15 is extending the 
clearly cited sense to include all “inherited assumptions” and all “rational assessment”. But 
“inherited assumptions” of beliefs are not intended actions and “rational assessment” of 
beliefs is not instrumental. Therefore, it is invalid to criticise the instrumentally “rational 
assessment” of an intended action because it involves “inherited assumptions” that have not 
themselves been given (because they are not intended actions) instrumentally “rational 
assessment”. This is reminiscent of the invalidity of the criticism that the empirical-
falsifiability criterion of science is self-refuting because it fails to be itself empirically 
falsifiable: it is invalid because the posited criterion is a philosophical theory and not itself a 
scientific theory. 
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All that said, it is not clear that we can even have completely “unexamined inherited 
assumptions”. For to use an “inherited assumption” is to assume that it is in some way correct 
(whether this means true, moral, prudent, etc.) rather than incorrect, and that seems to require 
some “assessment … however minimal”: if only seeing that it does appear to us to be correct 
(hence we use it) rather than incorrect (in which case we would not use it). 
(2) At least some “minimal” instrumentally “rational assessment” must have been 
“completed” in the sense that the agent deems it enough for action rather than further thought. 
If it had not, then the agent would be moving without having any idea of what he was trying 
to achieve and why—and that would not be an action. Of course, as L12 assumes critical 
rationalism, all assessments are held to be conjectural and provisional. In that sense they are 
never „justified‟ and “completed”. 
 
“6. Self-Interest” 
 
In L12 the interpretation of „self-interest‟ as all “self-perceived interests” is simply explained 
and shown to be compatible with genuine altruism, including by a thought experiment. Every 
agent perceives that he takes an interest in all manner of things. Some of these are—
ultimately, even if involving other people, etc.—narrowly self-interested; relating to his own 
pleasure, happiness, status, health, etc. (although an agent can be mistaken about the 
consequences and what is really best for him). Some of these are interests in the interests of 
other people or projects as ends in themselves; relating to family, friends, charities, science, 
etc. (although an agent can be mistaken about the consequences and what is really best for 
these). In order to be motivated, an agent must feel utility at the thought of promoting the 
interests of other people and projects. But these are altruistic to the extent that he would not 
wish or choose to lose these interests in other people and projects (by somehow forgetting 
them or ceasing to care about them) even if he knew that he would thereby feel more personal 
utility. 
F15 goes back to abandoning quotation in favour of tortuous attempted paraphrase. 
Responses will be made as this proceeds. 
 
I will state Lester‟s point as follows. In addition to his first-level interests, each person 
also has second-level interests, that is, interests in what first-level interests are 
fulfilled. 
 
L12 does not mention the “level” analysis at all in this context. 
 
When people act consciously, they are pursuing their second-level interests. 
 
That seems to be acting self-consciously. First-level interests are still conscious. 
 
Psychological egoism states that each person‟s second-level interests are concerned 
only with the fulfilment of his own first-level interests. 
 
No, psychological egoism states that each person is necessarily concerned only with his self-
referential interests (at whatever level); other people can only ever be means to his ends. 
 
Psychological altruism states that some people‟s second-level interests are sometimes 
concerned with other people‟s first-level interests. 
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No, altruism it is being concerned (at whatever level) with the interests of other people (at 
whatever level or none) for their own sakes. 
 
Lester‟s thesis of self-interest says that each person pursues his own second-level 
interests. 
 
No, people pursue those things they have a self-perceived interest in (at whatever level). 
Some interests will ultimately be about themselves (self-referential) even when involving 
other people. Some interests will be about other people for their own sakes, or as “ends in 
themselves” (which expression F15 finds “obscure” for some unexplained reason). 
 
This is consistent with psychological altruism because some people may have second-
level interests in other people‟s first-level interests. 
 
No, it is consistent with altruism because people can have a perceived (any-level) interest in 
the interests of other people for their own sakes (at any of their levels—or none: because they 
are perceived not to know what is good for themselves). 
 
Thus, second-level interests belong to the self but they may concern others.  
 
As may first-level interests concern others (as ends in themselves or as a means). 
 
It seems clear to me that this talk of „interests‟ is far too amorphous and woolly to be 
useful if our aim is to obtain anything approaching a clear or precise understanding of 
agency or instrumental rationality. 
 
As George Berkeley (1685-1753) observed in another context, “we have first raised a dust 
and then complain we cannot see”. L12 does not give anything whatsoever like this 
concocted “amorphous and woolly” and completely inaccurate “level” account of how people 
are always and only motivated by their self-perceived interests (in the self-perceived 
circumstances at the time) but are not thereby psychological egoists. Instead of quoting and 
dealing with L12‟s quite straightforward actual account, F15‟s earlier “classification” (four 
numbered distinctions in section four) is asserted “to be far more illuminating because it 
permits us to distinguish cases that Lester‟s scheme lumps together” (11). The various 
inadequacies of F15‟s “classification” have already been dealt with in section four. 
F15 then continues that “to use the same term for different cases slurs over differences 
that can be important. It achieves a simpler theory but, rather than advancing our 
understanding, it seems a barrier to it” (11). L12 is not replacing all different kinds of 
motivation with a single one. It is only explaining how these different kinds of motivation can 
still be self-perceived interests that can fit in the framework of instrumental rationality and 
utility-maximisation. Hence, this is “advancing our understanding” of how these things fit 
economic analysis and can thereby be related to want-satisfaction welfare and interpersonal 
liberty—which is the philosophical problem that L12 chapter two is trying to solve. As an 
analogy, suppose that the problem were to see how DNA-analysis explains all life-forms (on 
this planet, at least). It would be similarly confused to complain that “to use the same term for 
different cases slurs over differences that can be important. It achieves a simpler theory but, 
rather than advancing our understanding, it seems a barrier to it”. Of course, F15 just does 
reject the possibility of an instrumental-rationality analysis of all actions (analogous with 
rejecting a DNA-analysis of all life-forms), but none of the given criticisms appear to 
withstand scrutiny. 
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We are then given five possible ways of explaining why “Fred goes out of his way to 
cheer up a friend, despite the fact that it means missing a concert for which he has a ticket” 
(11). All this simply repeats F15‟s “classification”, which has been answered. But then F15 
also posits the responses that are taken to be consonant with L12. Replies will follow the 
quotations. 
 
What does Lester say about these different cases? In each case he says that Fred acted 
in his self-interest. 
 
No, L12 implies that Fred necessarily acted on a self-perceived interest, but not all interests 
of the self are interests in the self: for some interests are about other people (or other things) 
as ends in themselves. 
 
Fred‟s helping his friend was in his self-interest 
 
It was one of his self-perceived interests, whatever the reason it was done. 
 
because it was what he most desired (in (A)), or most valued (in (B)), or aimed to do 
(in (C) and (D)), or felt obliged to do (in (E)). 
 
Except that, a priori, these must all be what in a sense he has the strongest overall desire, or 
want, to do in the perceived circumstances at the time—or he would not attempt to do them. 
 
What does it contribute to our understanding 
 
To “our understanding” of which problem? For L12 it is the problem of how an a priori core 
of instrumental rationality can always relate to agency (and thereby to economics, want-
satisfaction welfare, and interpersonal liberty). 
 
to be told that there is a flimsy (indeed, vacuous) level of description at which all 
these different cases can be described in the same way? 
 
It solves the real and important philosophical problem. It is no more “vacuous” than DNA-
analysis of all life-forms, or mathematical-analysis in game-theory, or—more relevantly—
„aprioristic‟ Austrian economics. Moreover, there is also the reply given to David Ramsay 
Steele‟s similar criticism that this is “all too promiscuously applicable” (L12, 46): 
 
On the contrary, action that does not fit the supposed end-means scheme is primarily 
begging for the, possibly difficult, task of suggesting a plausible, testable, 
enlightening new theory of the motive in operation. The alternative too often is idly, 
promiscuously, and unenlighteningly to assert some non-specific „irrationality‟. (L12, 
46) 
 
But F15 answers, 
 
Nothing that I can see. 
 
Because F15 ignores the explained philosophical problem and how the offered solution is 
supposed to work (just as F13 does). Instead, we are given common-sense, colloquial 
classifications that are presented as essentially incommensurable. 
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F15 goes on to state that in “response to a somewhat different complaint from 
Amartya Sen (1977) that self-interest theories of action are vacuous, Lester asks three 
rhetorical questions” (12), which F15 quotes: 
  
How can we choose to do what we do not in some sense prefer to do? Must not the 
chosen alternative be better for us in some sense? Otherwise, where is the personal 
motivation? (2012, 42) 
 
F15 asserts that “these questions, intended as rhetorical, have more or less obvious answers 
contrary to those assumed by Lester” (12). Let us see whether F15‟s “more or less obvious” 
„rhetorical answers‟ withstand scrutiny. As usual, relevant quotations will be followed by 
replies at suitable junctures. 
 
First, I can do what I do not prefer to do, in the sense that I do not desire to do it, or in 
the sense that I do not value doing it. 
 
Which question is this supposed to be answering? Only the first question or all of them? Let 
us assume it is the first question.  The first question asks, “How can we choose to do what we 
do not in some sense prefer to do?” F15 simply does not answer that question. It is 
completely irrelevant to that question to assert that there is also a “sense” in which “I can do 
what I do not prefer to do”. L12 does not, and need not, deny that there are colloquial, 
common, and other senses in which we do not do what we prefer. It is making an a priori 
point that we must “in some sense prefer to do” what “we choose to do” (and hence 
instrumental rationality, etc., is possible). Similarly, of course, there is also “some sense” in 
which one must also “desire” and “value” doing what one does, and it is irrelevant that there 
are other senses in which one does not. 
 
Of course, if one stipulates, as Lester seems to do (2012, 42), that to act is to reveal a 
preference, then there will always be that sense in which whatever I do is what I 
prefer to do; but that is trivial. 
 
What one “stipulates” to be the case is thereby not a substantive part of any theory. It is held 
to be so by stipulative definition. L12 does not stipulate that “to act is to reveal a preference”. 
It observes that there appears to be a “sense” in which this is a priori true. And what is a 
priori true is not thereby “trivial”. In this case, we have an apparent a priori truth that allows 
for the instrumental rationality of all agency that economics can use (as can related theories 
of welfare and liberty). 
 
Second, an agent may choose to do something that is less valuable for him than an 
available alternative because it is more valuable for someone else (or for some other 
reason or none). 
 
Rather, “an agent may choose to do something that is less valuable for him [egoistically] than 
an available alternative because it is more valuable for someone else [whom he altruistically 
values more than his egoistic value in this case]”. What about, “(or for some other reason or 
none)”? It just looks unintelligible to imply that an agent need not in any way value what he 
chooses to do, or may even have no reason whatsoever to do it. It appears to be a priori true 
that an agent qua agent must have a reason to act (or it would not be an action) and that he 
must most value that action (or he would have attempted the one he valued more). 
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Third, we often act intentionally without motivation, in that we neither desire nor 
value what we do. 
 
Again, there are some senses in which “we neither desire nor value what we do”. Those 
senses would include not feeling an appetitive “desire” (or lust) and having no higher-order 
(second-level) “value” (including moral principles). But those senses are irrelevant to the a 
priori point that intentional acts must also in “some sense” be desired (or wanted) and valued 
(or thought good). 
 
Further, when we do desire or value what we do, the desire or valuation does not 
make us do it: our intentional actions are undetermined at every time before they are 
begun. 
 
The irrelevance of the determinism-indeterminism debate has already been explained. This is 
about what is a priori the case, not what is causal. However, it seems worth noting here that 
adherence to a “free will” that rejects compatibilism, determinism, and random-
indeterminism without offering any account of how that could operate, is another example of 
the incoherent background assumptions of F15. 
 
Lester‟s treatments of the objections of C. D. Broad and Tibor Machan (2012, 43-46) 
seem similarly question-begging. 
 
What does F15 mean by “question-begging”? Presumably, in this context, this is a charge of 
petitio principii. But all valid arguments are petitios (the conclusions have to be implicit in 
the premises), and so this is not a valid criticism. There is sufficient detail in the replies to 
Broad and Machan that they could have been properly criticised instead of being dismissed in 
this cursory and invalid way. 
 
“7. Maximisation” 
 
In L12 agents are explained and defended as utility-maximisers in the a priori sense that they 
attempt to take the action that maximises their utility (or want/preference-satisfaction) at that 
time in the circumstances as they conjecturally perceive them to be. This core sense thus 
differs from mainstream economics, which interprets utility-maximisation as a successful 
long-run achievement concerning all an agent‟s preferences (fully realising that this 
assumption of perfect calculation over time can only be a useful, broad approximation to the 
truth). 
F15 quotes L12 on how “we seek to maximise our want-satisfaction”: 
 
„as we compare possible choices we cannot help but take the option that in some way 
feels to be the most want-satisfying, or least want-dissatisfying, at the time.‟ … (2012, 
50-51). 
 
Two criticisms are then given: 
 
First, most of our decisions are habitual or conventional rather than reasoned … , so 
what is chosen is the usual rather than the best or the most want-satisfying. 
 
A first thing to note is that there is simply no inconsistency between choosing what is 
“habitual or conventional” or “usual” and what is “the most want-satisfying” thing at that 
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time; and therefore the “so” is an invalid inference. In fact, choosing in this way is often “the 
most want-satisfying” thing to do. And where it is not, we choose in the way that is. As L12 
observes and discusses, this is “introspectively knowable” (50). Otherwise, we would have to 
say that habits, etc., sometimes bypass our wants and cause our bodies to move like puppets. 
No very great self-consciousness is required. So it might superficially appear—especially 
after the largely-forgotten event—that one „automatically‟ or „unconsciously‟ made a cup of 
tea first thing in the morning as usual. But if one were to consider, or be asked about, one‟s 
behaviour at the time, one would immediately see that this habit is being followed because it 
is more want-satisfying, or preferred, than any alternative action that comes to mind 
(including simply not doing it). 
F15‟s use of “reasoned” is apparently intended to imply significant deliberation. But 
all thought—however superficial, panoramic, unselfconscious, and non-linguistic—is 
„reasoning‟ in a more general sense of that term. Thus we cannot engage in what is “habitual 
or conventional” without having “reasoned” about what we are doing in that sense. As in so 
many similar cases, with “reasoned” F15 does not capture some narrow, essential, correct 
usage.  
 
Second, even in cases where we reason about options, we usually cannot identify all 
the options, all their consequences or all the relevant evaluative principles … , so we 
often cannot identify the best, or the most want-satisfying. 
 
But the instrumental rationality thesis being defended only holds that we choose the “most 
want-satisfying” from among the options that we perceive at the time. So this criticism is the 
usual, unwitting, attack on a straw man. 
F15 cites Simon 1997‟s “bounded rationality” and the idea that we “„satisfice,‟ or 
look for a course of action that is good enough, rather than seeking to maximise, or look for 
the option which is best”.  F15 only slightly paraphrases L12‟s response, writing that 
“apparent satisficing is really maximising because, in such cases, at some point we guess that 
the disutility of search costs is likely to outweigh any other utility that we will achieve”, and 
F15 says that “it seems to be a wholly inadequate one” (13). First it is asserted that we “saw 
this in connection with habitual and conventional actions”. But that has already been 
answered. The following additional reasons are then given (and will be replied to here, as and 
where seems appropriate): 
 
First, suppose that Lester were right that the decision-maker is able to say that further 
search will be more costly than it is worth. 
 
L12 does not say that it “will be”. In terms of the a priori instrumental rationality being 
considered, it is not a matter of whether the decision-maker is able correctly to predict the 
consequences of his decision. He makes the judgement, however cursorily, now that as he 
considers what he conjectures to be further search costs and the likelihood of a better 
outcome, his current most want-satisfying (or utility-maximising) option is to stop searching 
and act. 
 
This does not alter the fact that the decision-maker would still not have enough 
information about the options before him to be able to say which is better than the 
others. 
 
As we always operate within a framework of conjectures, and as the potential information is 
infinite, and as we never know what relevant possibilities we might have overlooked, then it 
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is in principle impossible in any objective and supported sense to know that we have “enough 
information about the options”. It is, as we have seen, also irrelevant. 
 
Second, when Lester says that the decision-maker guesses that further search would 
not be worthwhile, he might mean that the decision-maker just makes an arbitrary, 
unreasoned decision to search no farther. 
 
No. A guess, or conjecture, aims at a certain outcome and is shaped by critical considerations, 
insofar as these occur to us. Thus it is never “arbitrary” or “unreasoned”.  
 
Third, if Lester means … that he calculates whether further search is worthwhile, then 
we get a vicious circle. 
 
And then F15 goes, yet again, into fanciful and elaborate “first-level options” and “second-
level options” that he asserts, wholly incorrectly, to be “Lester‟s view”.  It is not held, or 
logically implied, in L12 that the decision-maker inevitably “calculates” in any complicated 
way, although he may if he prefers that option. At some point, he simply finds that the 
thought of acting now gives him more utility now than engaging in further search costs. Of 
course, in terms of his overall long-term utility he might be making a mistake. But the a priori 
instrumental rationality that is being defended is not about efficiently maximising long-term 
utility. 
 
“8. Morals” 
 
In L12 morals are given a formal interpretation that explains how moral beliefs or sentiments 
fit instrumental rationality, rather than being outside it or conflicting with it. In short, the 
categorical nature of moral obligations means that, when they are genuinely held, they 
necessarily override all non-moral goals in terms of the utility from keeping them and the 
disutility from breaking them. 
A first important thing to note is that the interpretation of the categorical nature of 
moral obligations defended here is not necessary for making sense of a priori instrumental 
rationality. It would be sufficient that different moral obligations were ascribed variable 
amounts of (dis)utility, and that these compete with the (dis)utility of the other choices that an 
agent has. That said, if we assume that people can simply choose to act immorally, then that 
would tend to undermine the extent that it is thought worth attempting to reason with them 
about what is moral and immoral (and perhaps thereby even discovering that they are right 
and that we are mistaken). Dogmatism and coercion become the default positions, which will 
tend to militate against liberty and welfare (thereby being both undesirable and not fitting the 
“compatibility thesis” of L12). 
F15 attempts to paraphrase L12 on how morals fit into instrumental rationality, and 
then selectively quotes L12: 
 
fully to hold a moral obligation sentimentally, not to feel it uncertainly or as a slight 
pricking of the conscience, is always to act on it in appropriate circumstances…It is 
possible to defend moral theories intellectually without really feeling them. Without 
seeing this, one can fail to realize that one‟s „official‟ or „theoretical‟ moral position is 
a sort of public recommendation that one might not personally feel, value, or 
desire…we cannot knowingly do what we feel, at that moment, is immoral (2012, 51-
52).  
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As usual, F15 responds with more common sense than philosophy (responses will 
follow the quotations): 
 
Lester‟s position here seems to fly in the face of human experience. 
 
This “human experience” seems on a par with F15‟s earlier “descriptions of ordinary facts of 
life”. It is the problematic, philosophically unexamined, way that things are usually seen. 
 
I seriously doubt that that there has ever been, or will be, any person who has not on 
many occasions acted in a way that he is at the time of acting convinced is wrong. 
 
This is emphatically to reassert the common-sense position instead of criticising the 
philosophical arguments that L12 presents. 
 
One type of case involves weakness of will, 
 
Which myth has been dealt with already (section three). 
 
but in many cases there is no such weakness because the agent is resolute in pursuing 
the course he is convinced is wrong and perhaps steels himself to do it. 
 
As this fails to directly address the arguments in L12, the most useful response is probably to 
repeat some of them. It is generally accepted that moral theories are about categorical—or 
absolute—limits on acceptable behaviour, irrespective of any other conflicting aims an agent 
might have. This categorical feature is, ipso facto, never overridable. If there are perceived 
extenuating reasons to do something that is generally described as “immoral” (such as a clash 
with a more important moral principle, or some great evil would otherwise occur), then it is 
perceived as not actually immoral in those circumstances after all. If behaviour that is 
immoral (“wrong”) is behaviour that is absolutely unacceptable/impermissible/undesirable, 
then it is a priori necessary that someone cannot sincerely hold, at time T, that X is immoral 
(i.e., feel it to be absolutely unacceptable) and also, at time T, try to do X (thereby implying it 
is felt to be acceptable). F15 does not criticise this philosophical line of reasoning, it merely 
confidently asserts the common-sense position that is inconsistent with it. 
 
The varied situations and ways in which this happens has been explored extensively 
in literature, and also in film, 
 
That the common-sense position is accepted in popular culture is not a philosophical 
argument against L12‟s position. 
 
and its effects have been analysed in some psychological studies of cognitive 
dissonance 
 
Something or other may be “analysed” in those studies. But without a coherent explanation of 
chosen immorality, that is like saying that the effects of seeing square-circles “have been 
analysed in some psychological studies of cognitive dissonance”. 
 
Typically, the person who knowingly does wrong 
 
There is still no explanation of how this is coherent. 
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tries to dissipate the discomfort he feels by seeking a way to justify himself: „It is not 
so bad,‟ „the circumstances are exceptional,‟ „I have a good excuse,‟ „other people 
would do the same in my position,‟ and so on. 
 
But some of those reasons will sometimes be sufficient to persuade the agent that, despite the 
general moral rule, his circumstances constitute a genuine exception. And some such reasons 
must be believed if he is to decide that what at first might appear to be completely 
unacceptable is actually acceptable in his circumstances. Alternatively, as the quotation of 
L12 says, it is possible that he doesn‟t genuinely believe his “official” or “theoretical” moral 
position. Due to confusion, he might even genuinely believe that he believes it, but that is not 
the same thing as genuinely believing it. Actions speak louder than words here: when people 
act, it will tend to be on the basis of what they really believe. 
 
He tries to delude himself into thinking that he has not really done wrong at all. 
 
Note first this switch to after the event: “he has not really done wrong”. Of course someone 
can change his mind about the moral status of his action even moments afterwards. That said, 
it seems—by introspection—impossible that we can intentionally delude ourselves in the 
sense of making ourselves believe what we do not believe (try to believe that you are 
Napoleon, or can fly by flapping your arms). It is possible to try, of course, but it will be in 
vain. However, it is quite plausible that, around the time of the action, the agent is seeking 
sound reasons to believe that he is not about to do wrong. And at the moment of his action 
that is what he must believe—however influenced by emotion his reasoning might be—in 
order to overcome the moral view that his behaviour is completely unacceptable. He will 
always feel that whatever he actually does is fully acceptable (in fact, the best thing to do in 
the perceived circumstances) and thereby not immoral (categorically unacceptable) at all. 
 
This, indeed, may be the truth behind Lester‟s claim: not that no one knowingly does 
wrong, but that most people who knowingly do wrong succeed in deluding 
themselves that they have not done so. 
 
All this has now been explained, but it might help to recapitulate. It is, on analysis, a priori 
incoherent to assert that someone “knowingly does wrong”: by understanding that immoral 
behaviour is categorically unacceptable and what that logically entails if a moral view is 
genuinely believed. Moreover, no one can choose to delude himself. And it is, in any case, 
irrelevant that we might assess the morality differently after the act (“that they have not done 
so”). 
 F15 then asserts, without a page reference, that “Lester refers to Hare for further 
argument for his [Lester‟s] position” (15). However, L12 rejects Hare 1952 (H52) on this 
matter, despite agreeing with parts of H52‟s moral theory (L12, 53, 209). F15 then digresses 
into a paraphrase of H52‟s moral theory and adds criticisms of it. It is not relevant to defend 
H52 itself here, but—in the interest of replying comprehensively to F15 in L12‟s terms—
some tentative attempts at responses will follow quotations of the criticisms. 
 
the objection I want to raise here is that we can discuss dispassionately whether a 
thing is good or right, without making any prescriptions; 
 
Of course, if we fail to reach any conclusions. Or, perhaps, if we are interested in what things 
are, in themselves, “good or right” rather than prescribing what ought to be done about them. 
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 indeed, we can even prescribe what we think is not good or not right. 
 
To sincerely “prescribe” a moral view seems to imply that the ends are, overall, perceived by 
the prescriber to be “good” and that actively promoting them is “right”. 
 
Hare‟s response to this objection is to say that, in such cases, we are not making 
genuine value-judgements, but are rather making an „inverted-commas use‟ of the 
terms „good‟ or „right,‟ that is, we are using the terms to refer to the non-value 
properties which incline some people to call things „good‟ or „right‟ (1952, 163-70). 
 
If this means that we can insincerely prescribe things according to how other people use 
„good‟ or „right‟, then that makes sense. We must think that such insincerity is not immoral, 
of course. 
 
However, Hare is here merely re-describing the examples to fit his theory. 
 
To show how putative counterexamples can be interpreted to fit a theory that is being 
defended is not thereby to engage in “re-describing the examples” in any invalid way. 
 
Perhaps this can be seen most clearly if we consider a character like the devil, who 
may prescribe what he thinks to be bad or wrong. 
 
Rather, the devil will prescribe some things that are “bad or wrong” for humans because he 
perceives those things as good and right in his terms. He has different moral values. 
 
Hare has to treat this as an inverted-commas use of „bad‟ or „wrong‟ (1952, 175). But 
that is mistaken, since what the devil intends to prescribe is not whatever some people 
consider to be bad or wrong; rather, being the devil, he intends to prescribe what is 
really, objectively, bad or wrong. 
 
Rather, the devil “intends to prescribe what is really, objectively, bad or wrong” for people 
because he perceives it as good and right for him to do this. 
 
If he says „what is good is bad,‟ he is using one term descriptively, to talk of what is 
good (or bad) and the other term to deprecate (or commend); 
 
If the devil means that what is good for people is perceived as bad by him (or what is 
perceived as good by him is bad for people), then that seems to make sense. Similarly, what 
is good for the greenfly is perceived as bad by the gardener. 
 
and similarly if he says „the right thing to do is the wrong thing to do.‟ 
 
If the devil means that what is “the right thing to do” for people is perceived as “the wrong 
thing to do” by him (or, again, vice versa), then that also seems to make sense. Similarly, 
avoiding the slug traps is the right thing to do for the slugs but the wrong thing to do as 
perceived by the gardener. 
 
We can understand this easily enough, because there is a bit of the devil in each of us, 
though some people seem to have more of it than others. 
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Rather, we can understand this easily enough because we can see the different perspectives of 
different agents. 
 
Thus, while it is true that terms such as „good‟ and „right‟ may be used by speakers to 
prescribe, we should acknowledge that this is a secondary use, their primary use being 
to ascribe a value property. 
 
Possibly true, but not relevant to the real dispute. 
 
Hare‟s view is mistaken because it omits mention of the properties of goodness and 
rightness. 
 
As they are described, the “properties of goodness and rightness” are relative to the different 
values, ends, and perceptions of the different agents. (This is not to deny that there could be a 
correct theory of “goodness and rightness” that transcends individual perceptions of these 
things.) 
Back to F15 on L12: 
 
As so often, Lester attempts to bolster his case by asking a rhetorical question: „can 
you recall doing anything that clearly felt immoral at the time that you did it?‟ 
 
As so often, F15 attempts to bolster its case by ignoring the details of the surrounding 
arguments of L12, seizing on some illustrative question that is asked as a serious test, and 
then calling it “rhetorical” and giving a common-sense rhetorical answer to it. 
 
His assumption, of course, is that the answer is „no.‟ 
 
In fact, L12 explains why the answer should be „no‟, but clearly assumes that the question is 
always likely to be answered „yes‟ if faced with common-sense assumptions that ignore the 
explanation.  
 
However, my answer is „yes.‟ 
 
Quite. 
 
I can recall many examples of my doing things that I clearly thought were immoral. 
 
That means “doing things” that were sincerely believed at the exact time of the chosen 
actions to be categorically impermissible/unacceptable/undesirable chosen actions. How can 
that make sense? (That question is not rhetorical.) 
 
Anyone else could do the same, provided he has not deluded himself with the self-
justifying chicaneries of cognitive dissonance. 
 
Anyone else might be equally confused by common-sense assumptions, but he cannot choose 
to delude himself, and being “deluded” after the event would be irrelevant to the thesis, in 
any case. 
 
26 
 
On Lester‟s mechanistic theory of motivation, the supposed fact of the impossibility 
of doing what one knows to be wrong is explained by positing that moral desires are 
always stronger than non-moral desires (2012, 52). He says:  
  
what is felt to be immoral is what we feel no one should ever do in the 
circumstances; it is a categorical sentiment… (17) 
 
And here F15‟s ellipses cut out and ignore the explanation of the categorical nature of 
morals: 
 
about a type of behavior in some group. One cannot at the same time (at least, 
not without confusion) do what one feels no one should do. Moral values must 
be obeyed because if disobeyed they are, ipso facto, not held categorically. 
Most moral philosophers seem to agree that morals are at least categorical 
whatever else they are. (L12, 52) 
 
Instead, F15 jumps to, 
 
One source of confusion here is where our general moral feelings (such as 
feeling that lying is usually immoral) differ from our specific moral feelings 
(such as feeling that some particular lie is moral). This seems to occur because 
such general morals are usually held ceteris paribus (2012, 52-53). (17) 
  
And F15‟s reply (with responses made here) immediately follows. 
 
Is it possible to have a feeling with so reticulated a propositional content 
 
The feeling does not have a propositional content but is a response to an idea. It is a feeling of 
complete rejection at the thought of a certain type of behaviour. We then typically call that 
behaviour „wrong‟ or „immoral‟. Similarly, a feeling of belief might be the response to the 
thought of some descriptive proposition. We then typically call that proposition „true‟. Or a 
feeling of delight might be a response to a passage of music. We then typically call that music 
„beautiful‟. 
 
as no one should ever do an action of type A in these circumstances (where an 
appropriate action-description is substituted for „A‟) 
 
It seems clear enough that someone can have a feeling of complete rejection (categorical 
impermissibility) for an action of type A in circumstances X (e.g., A: punching someone, X: 
when we do not like the look of him).    
 
 or lying is usually immoral 
 
The feeling of complete rejection is a response to the thought of typical examples of lying. 
 
or, even more implausibly, ceteris paribus, no one should ever do an action of type A 
in these circumstances (where an appropriate action-description is substituted for 
„A‟)? 
 
The thought itself may be as complicated and qualified as someone is capable of entertaining. 
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The supposition seems ridiculous. 
 
L12 does not assert or imply the “supposition” that the feeling of complete rejection itself 
includes the idea to which it is a response. 
 
Of course, one might say, „I feel that no one should ever do that sort of action in these 
circumstances.‟ But there one is not using „feel‟ literally, to talk about a desire or 
sentiment, but to indicate one‟s uncertainty about the thought one is expressing.  
 
This, typical, lapse into the common-sense usage of colloquial language is, typically, entirely 
beside the point. If there are moral feelings about certain types of action—and it seems that 
there are—then one of those feelings can quite intelligibly be expressed by saying, “I feel that 
no one should ever do that sort of action in these circumstances”. It is irrelevant that those 
words could also be given the interpretation that F15 does. 
 
It is, indeed, possible to have an attitude toward a complex thought, for example, one 
might admire it or feel happy at the contemplation of it, 
 
Or have a feeling of absolute rejection towards the type action it describes. 
 
but the feeling itself does not have the structured complexity of the thought. 
 
And L12 does not say or imply that it does. 
 
Lester seems driven to supposing that it does, not simply by his mechanistic theory of 
motivation, 
 
There has to be felt motivation or we would not have anything to make us act. That does not 
make that motivation “mechanistic”. F15 appears to interpret all felt motivation as thereby 
mechanistic and so opts instead for an incoherent and mysterious motivation that is somehow 
supposed to be a pure “act of will”. 
 
 but by that in conjunction with his attachment to construing values as felt desires. 
 
To value something must be, first and foremost, to desire it in some respect: if not for oneself, 
then that it exist, etc. All real values must be felt. It is only a metaphor to speak of “values” 
that are not felt. For instance, “liberty is a value” cannot literally make sense. What social, or 
interpersonal, liberty is literally—on one interpretation, at least—is people not being 
proactively constrained by each other (see Lester 2012, 2014, 2016). One can certainly value 
such liberty, but liberty does not thereby become a literal value. The idea that one can 
genuinely hold any kind of value, however abstract it is, without having any desire as regards 
it is not intelligible. 
 
“9. Conclusion” 
 
F15‟s “conclusion” summarises its criticisms of what it construes to be L12‟s arguments. 
Rather than summarise the responses already made here, a more general conclusion might be 
more useful. 
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 L12 aside for a moment, if we were to take F15 completely seriously, then this would 
appear to give rise to one obvious and severe problem. Economics is about the efficient 
allocation of scare resources when there are alternative uses and ranked goals.
8
 But as a social 
science economics is also based on some version of people as instrumentally rational „self-
interested utility-maximisers‟ (homo economicus). Abandoning this assumption would 
appear to make economics as a social science impossible or almost uselessly abstract (it 
would be somewhat like the joke about the physicist‟s farming advice that starts by assuming 
spherical cows in a vacuum). 
Otherwise, F15 and F13 comprise the most sustained criticisms so far of the overall 
theory of new-paradigm libertarianism that L12 (etc.) propounds (although F15 is far less 
central and there is a great deal more in L12 than F15 and F13 even touch on). And if only 
for this reason they have some merit; and that they have, thereby, prompted further 
explication of the relevant parts of the theory. However, as both this reply and L14 ch.10 
show, they fail even to demonstrate a grasp of either the relevant philosophical problems or 
the offered philosophical solutions. Unless and until this philosophical theory of 
libertarianism is given serious critical consideration, libertarianism will remain at the level of 
fundamental philosophical confusion explained briefly in L14 ch.1. Namely, that libertarian 
texts typically make three great errors (to simplify any longer and more nuanced list): 
 
1) Seeking a foundation or justification: this is an error because—as critical-rationalist 
epistemology explains—there are no „supporting justifications‟ of empirical theories 
(they have infinite implications, which finite theory-laden evidence cannot support, 
only test) or of any propositions (arguments entail an infinite regress, or circularity, or 
dogmatic starting assumptions). All theories necessarily remain in the realm of 
criticisable conjectures. 
 
2) Taking sides between deontologism and consequentialism, etc.: this is an error 
because there is no systematic clash between these two main moral and practical 
desiderata, or with them and defensible forms of most of the other candidates 
(contractarianism, eudaimonism, social justice, etc.). The libertarian conjecture needs 
to be explained and defended in terms of all defensible desiderata. 
 
3) Having no explicit, non-moral, non-propertarian, abstract theory of liberty: this is 
an error because there is something that „libertarian‟ liberty abstractly is („the absence 
of proactively imposed interpersonal costs‟), and this can then be used—along with 
contingent circumstances—to deduce all the broad practical implications (self-
ownership, private property, minimising clashes of liberty, rectifications of proactive 
impositions, etc., etc.).
9
 An abstract theory of interpersonal liberty is needed at the 
centre of the libertarian conjecture. 
                                                         
8
 Thus interpreted, it can be applied to the evolved structure and behaviour of non-human 
animals and even plants: greater economic efficiency having a greater survival value. Could it 
further be applied in some way to the evolution of the universe, multiverse, or the many-
worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics? 
9
 Most libertarians‟ greatest unknown problem can be posed more starkly: it is impossible to 
explain how some types of activity, or property, or rights are compatible with interpersonal 
liberty—while others are not—without having an abstract theory of such liberty that is 
completely independent of any activity, or property, or rights. Almost all libertarians have no 
such theory. That is as absurd as if almost all utilitarians were to have no theory of what 
utility is. 
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Consequently, libertarian essays in books and scholarly periodicals (whether Nozickian, 
Rothbardian, or whatever) are often sophisticated but, nevertheless, ultimately superficial—
with the former obscuring the latter. The sophistication is in the complexity and ingenuity of 
the approaches taken. But that is usually all at a superficial level that makes some of the three 
cited errors. Thus there is often an intuitive approximation to the right sort of answer, but it 
does not ultimately make proper sense—and critical texts often detect this and correctly point 
it out. L12, L14, and L16 are replete with examples. 
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